Ocean and Coastal Law Journal
Volume 17 | Number 2

Article 8

2011

Redefining Coastal Wetland Policy In Search Of
Economic And Environmental History
Paul J. Morrow

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj
Recommended Citation
Paul J. Morrow, Redefining Coastal Wetland Policy In Search Of Economic And Environmental History, 17 Ocean & Coastal L.J. (2011).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj/vol17/iss2/8

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Ocean and Coastal Law Journal by an authorized administrator of University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For
more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.

REDEFINING COASTAL WETLAND POLICY IN
SEARCH OF ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL
HARMONY
Paul J. Morrow, Esq.*

LAWYERS, SWAMPS, AND MONEY: U.S. WETLAND LAW, POLICY, AND
POLITICS. By Royal C. Gardner. Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 2011.
Pp. 1, 199. $35.00
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, environmental awareness has come to the forefront
as society continues to realize the negative environmental impacts that
arise from the uninhibited growth of modern economies. Terms such as
“green electricity,” “hybrid,” “Energy-Star,” and “organic” have come
into common use. Likewise, concerns about global warming, ocean
pollution, and Arctic melting have resulted in political activism across
the world.
At the same time, the benefits derived from modern
economic development create an implicit need to balance the costs of
such development with environmental sustainability. Like it or not,
mankind’s impact on the environment will never be eliminated. Instead,
creative solutions must be found to enable society to better harmonize
economic development with environmental protection. To date, the
development of environmental enforcement standards has been
inconsistent, and the complexity of economic and environmental
coexistence has created difficulties for regulators and politicians alike.
This review focuses on the legal, economic, and social implications of
the use of wetlands, as analyzed by Professor Royal C. Gardner in his
book, Lawyers, Swamps, and Money: U.S. Wetland Law, Policy, and
Politics.1 As Professor Gardner states:
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[W]etlands pay society’s bills. Wetlands provide a host of
ecosystem services, functions that benefit people. Long viewed
as the mosquito-breeding nuisances that must be drained,
wetlands have recently had their reputations rehabilitated. We
now recognize that wetlands provide important habitat for
animals and plants, support the seafood industry, protect homes
and businesses from floods, and help improve water quality.
Sadly, we often appreciate the value of wetlands and their
ecosystem services only after they are gone (or degraded).2
Professor Gardner’s book takes on the laudable goal of providing its
reader with a fundamental understanding of the inner-workings of
wetland policy. It accomplishes this task in the short span of 200 pages,
bringing the reader through the regulatory framework of wetland law and
into the world of definitions and mitigation techniques. Along the way,
Gardner entertains us with various cases and political stories that have
helped to define the field. The result is that Professor Gardner’s unique
perspective makes this book a must-read for any individual interested in
wetland law.
II. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF WETLANDS
Gardner’s analysis begins with a well rounded historical examination
of the public perception of wetlands.3 Early perceptions of wetlands
were bleak, and perhaps no case better displays this than the 1900 case of
Leovy v. United States, in which the Supreme Court stated “that swamps
and stagnant waters are the cause of malarial and malignant fevers, and
that the police power is never more legitimately exercised than in
removing such nuisances.”4 The Court further noted that conversion of
the swamp land in question to agricultural land would increase its value
from $5,000 to $300,000.5
Such a negative view of wetlands was not atypical of the times. In
fact, some scholars posit that we have lost more than half of the wetlands
in the United States since the 1780s.6 For at least ten states, this number

1. ROYAL C. GARDNER, LAWYERS, SWAMPS
POLICY, AND POLITICS (2011).
2. Id. at 1-2.
3. Id. at 5.
4. 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900).
5. Id. at 628.
6. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 95.
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rises to as high as seventy percent.7 Much of the reason for this loss can
be traced to farmers, who sought out wetlands as nutrient-rich soils.8
Gardner states:
With government subsidies and price supports, farmers
continued to drain and convert wetlands well into the twentieth
century. Between 1950 and 1970, annual wetland losses
attributable to agricultural activities were about 250,000 acres.
By the 1970s and the 1980s, the rate of loss was still 290,000
acres per year. Only recently . . . has farming ceased to be the
primary cause of wetland losses.9
Wetlands were also extensively developed to accommodate commercial
and residential development as developers sought out wetlands as a
cheaper alternative to dry land.10 Today, rural and urban development
has taken the lead in the destruction of wetlands.11 Additionally, the
introduction of invasive species,12 oil exploration,13 coal removal,14 and
road construction projects15 have also contributed to the loss of wetland
habitat.
In recent years, however, wetlands have enjoyed a more positive
public image. Not only have scientific advances brought to light the
importance of wetlands as animal habitats, and thus piqued the interest of
environmentalists the world over,16 they have also revealed the
importance of wetlands to the sustainability of commercial fisheries.17
As Gardner points out, “75 percent of commercial fish and shellfish in
the United States rely on estuaries and coastal wetland systems.”18 This
fact was heavily highlighted by the national media19 and academics

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. (internal citations omitted).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 97.
13. Id. at 96.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 8.
17. Id. at 11.
18. Id.
19. John M. Broder, House Panel Faults Administration Spill Response, N.Y. TIMES
(June 2, 2011, 2:22 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/house-panel-faultsadministration-spill-response/.
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during the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster.20 Likewise, wetland birdrelated activity accounts for nearly $32 billion in annual economic
spending.21 Wetlands have also been found to improve water quality,
mitigate flood damages by absorbing water, and provide recreational
value to millions each year.22
These factors have combined to foster a government policy of
achieving “no net loss” of wetland acreage.23 To realize this goal,
Congress implemented the “Swampbuster” program in 1985, whereby
farmers were penalized in the form of cuts to their subsidies if they
“drained or altered a wetland.”24 Similarly, the Wetlands Reserve
Program protected wetlands by paying farmers who “restor[ed] and
protect[ed] wetlands.”25 This program allowed the government to pay for
up to a hundred percent of the restoration costs, depending on the level of
wetland protection provided by a farmer.26 Since 1992, the Wetlands
Reserve Program has resulted in the protection of “almost 2 million acres
at a cost of approximately $2.1 billion,” and both programs have
generally been regarded as successes.27
Non-farming projects have proven a more difficult challenge. One
method of offsetting wetland losses from rural and urban construction
has been through “compensatory mitigation.”28 When issuing a section
404 permit, the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) will require a
developer to offset any wetland damage it causes by “restor[ing],
enhanc[ing], creat[ing], and/or preserv[ing] other wetlands.”29 In this
way, the Corps hopes to grant permits while still realizing “no net loss.”30
However, several studies suggest that the section 404 mitigation program
has not worked.31 Enforcement of mitigation commitments has been
“almost nonexistent,”32 and even when permitees have restored wetlands,
the long-term effects of that restoration remain questionable.33
20. Edward B. Barbier, Coastal Wetland Restoration and the Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1821, 1832 (2011).
21. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 56.
22. Id. at 11-12.
23. Id. at 93.
24. Id. at 100.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 100-01.
27. Id. at 101 (internal citations omitted).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 102.
31. Id. at 106.
32. Id. at 109.
33. Id. at 108.
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Gardner highlights two creative solutions that have arisen to resolve
the problems associated with compensatory mitigation.34 One is the idea
of mitigation banking, which enables developers to offset the impact of
wetland development by purchasing environmental credits from other
developers who have restored wetlands.35
Under this theory,
performance mitigation credits are granted to a developer once they
satisfactorily restore a wetland.36 These credits can be banked for future
use, allowing the developer to offset damages from wetland projects in
advance.37 Beginning in 1993, this concept was taken a step further
when the first entrepreneurial mitigation bank began to sell mitigation
credits to developers from restoration projects it had completed.38
Congress demonstrated its support of this process in 1998 when it passed
the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century,39 which expressly
created a market for mitigation banks.40
The other creative solution currently competing with mitigation
banking is in-lieu fee mitigation.41 Here, a third party takes on the
obligations to restore wetlands that the developer incurs in exchange for
a fee.42 The third party is typically a nonprofit organization or
government agency, and the funds received from the developer are
deposited into an account for use on a later project.43 Thus, unlike in
mitigation banking, the restoration is not completed at the front. While
this is one downside of in-lieu fee mitigation, the program does provide
better protection than the compensatory mitigation program because
payment from the developer is still received before the development
project begins.44 However, Gardner points out that the success of the inlieu fee program has not been on par with that of mitigation banking.45
In attempting to provide coherence among these three programs, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Corps issued a final rule in
2008 governing compensatory mitigation and expressly providing for
34. For an extensive discussion of the merits of all three mitigation options, see
generally, Travis E. Booth, Compensatory Mitigation: What is the Best Approach?, 11 U.
BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 205 (2004).
35. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 13.
36. Id. at 112-13.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 115.
39. 23 U.S.C. § 108 (2006).
40. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 119.
41. Id. at 129.
42. Id. at 130.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 131.
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mitigation banking and in-lieu fee mitigation.46 Mitigation banking was
given primacy in the regulation (meaning a mitigation banking credit was
given more value than other mitigation credits) over in-lieu fee
mitigation, with more traditional compensatory mitigation coming in as
the least favorable option.47 Thus, at present, developers have three
options: buy a mitigation banking credit up front, pay for in-lieu fee
credits, or conduct compensatory mitigation actions on their own.
III. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Professor Gardner’s book dedicates itself largely to the task of
describing the regulatory framework governing wetland policy. This
comprehensive coverage includes a detailed exploration into the realm of
administrative law, which largely governs wetland law.48 Agencies
make, apply, regulate, and enforce the rules, and while courts may
review final agency decisions, they are often reluctant to overturn them.49
This canon of review gives the EPA and Corps enormous power to
regulate the spirit of economic development. Accordingly, Professor
Gardner emphasizes the importance of “understanding administrative
law [as] a prerequisite for understanding wetland law and policy.”50
Providing a short course in administrative law, Gardner cuts through
the complexities of the process to highlight the importance that it plays in
wetland law.51 He quickly focuses the reader on political realities by
pointing out that Congress provides the authority and funding, while the
President provides the political appointments for administrative
agencies.52 While agencies are partially insulated from political
pressures by virtue of their corps of career specialists, Gardner points to
examples of instances where even career employees were not immune
from political backfire.53 That being said, Gardner accepts the presence
of politics in the administrative process because of the legitimacy it
brings to agency actions affecting private and public property rights.54

46. Id. at 151 (referencing 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(b) (2012)).
47. Id. at 156.
48. Id. at 16.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 15.
52. Id. at 18.
53. Id. at 20. (pointing to Michael Davis, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Civil Works).
54. Id. at 22.
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Next, Lawyers, Swamps, and Money turns to the origins of wetland
law. Here, a brief synopsis is appropriate. In 1972, Congress passed the
Clean Water Act over the veto of President Nixon in order to “restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters.”55 To accomplish this task, Congress established
specialized permitting processes for various forms of pollutants.56 The
EPA was given authority to grant permits for point sources of pollutants
through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
under section 402.57 However, as it soon became apparent that “dredge
and fill material” from construction projects harmed wetlands as
extensively as more traditional sources of toxic pollutants, Congress
enacted section 404 and placed authority to issue permits for such
materials with the Corps.58 To forge a compromise between the House
(which favored the Corps because of its experience with construction
projects under the Rivers and Harbors Act) and Senate (which favored
the EPA because of its focus on environmental issues), section 404 was
drafted to provide the EPA with veto power over the Corps’ decisions.59
Gardner’s characterization of the EPA and Corps as “strange
bedfellows” governing the realm of wetland law strikes true because it
recognizes the complexities of co-management that exist between an
organization with construction as its lifeblood (the Corps) and one with
environmental protection at its core (the EPA).60 For the government to
have its act together, the system must be coherent in authority. As a
solution, “the Corps and the EPA signed an enforcement memorandum
of agreement (MOA) in 1989 that delineated their roles and
responsibilities.”61 Pursuant to this agreement,
the Corps agreed to be the lead agency for actions involving
section 404 permit violations terms and conditions, which made
sense since the Corps is the permit-issuing agency. For
unpermitted discharges (i.e. when someone filled a wetland and
failed to apply for a permit), the MOA left open which agency
would be lead. It stated that the Corps would serve as lead
agency, unless the case involved a repeat violator or a flagrant
violation, and then the EPA would step in. The EPA would also
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 74-75.
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 160.
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be the lead agency, however, if it simply requested a particular
case.62
A. Waters of the United States
Gardner turns next to the questions of definition that have plagued
the field of wetland law. Under the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Corps
had long ago established that the definition of “navigable waters” would
mean those waters that could be traversed “in the traditional sense:
navigable in fact (used in commerce), navigable in the future with
reasonable improvements, navigable in the past, and subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide.”63 Like the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Clean
Water Act also included the language “navigable waters,” and the Corps
quickly interpreted this to mean that its jurisdiction under that Act
extended only to navigable waters falling within its Rivers and Harbors
Act definition.64 This left wetlands that were adjacent to navigable
waters, but un-navigable themselves, in a precarious situation.
Opponents of the Corps’ interpretation quickly latched onto the fact that,
unlike in the Rivers and Harbors Act, Congress defined “navigable
waters” to mean “waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act.65
Thus, the Corps’ interpretation was challenged in Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Callaway, and the U.S. District Court ruled that the
Corps’ definition was incorrect.66 Thereafter, Gardner states, the Corps
defined “waters of the United States” to include “wetlands adjacent to
traditional navigable waters and their tributaries, as well as all other
isolated wetlands (having no hydrological connection to other
waterbodies) that had some nexus to interstate commerce.”67
This newfound harmony, however, was short-lived as private
property owners and developers soon challenged the reasonableness of
the Corps’ interpretation. In United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes,68 when a property owner challenged an injunction by the Corps
from developing on marshland, the Supreme Court upheld the Corps’
decision to include “adjacent wetlands” in the definition of “waters of the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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United States.”69 However, the Corps fared worse in the face of a
challenge to its inclusion of “isolated waters” in the definition of its
wetland jurisdiction on the basis of the Migratory Bird Rule.70 Here, a
consortium of Chicago-area communities seeking to utilize the site of a
blue heron rookery to deposit nonhazardous waste challenged the Corps’
Migratory Bird Rule, claiming that it was not a reasonable interpretation
of the Clean Water Act.71 The Supreme Court agreed and struck down
the Corps’ interpretation on the basis that isolated waters, as defined by
the Migratory Bird Rule, lacked “a significant nexus” to the navigable
waters of the United States.72 As a result, the Corps was forced to
refocus its jurisdiction over isolated waters by basing it on the hydrologic
connection of those waters to navigable waters.73
The Supreme Court considered the Corps’ definition of “waters of
the United States” again in Rapanos v. United States, when challenges
were made to the Corps’ jurisdiction over wetlands located near manmade drainage ditches that discharged in navigable waters.74 The Court
was unable to come to a majority decision as to which waters fell within
the jurisdiction of the Corps under the Clean Water Act.75 Four justices
stated that a wetland must be “a relatively permanent body of water
connected to traditional interstate navigable waters”76 and having “a
continuous surface connection . . . making it difficult to determine where
the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”77 Four other justices believed
that the Corps’ interpretation was “a quintessential example of the
Executive’s reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision.”78 Finally,
Justice Kennedy, who cast the deciding vote, believed that a showing of
a “significant nexus” must be made for jurisdiction to rest with the
69. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 43 (referencing Riverview Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at
135).
70. Id. at 44 (referencing Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)). The Migratory Bird Rule stemmed from the
announcement by the Corps that it would “regulate activities in isolated waters (including
wetlands) that are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state
lines.’” Id. The focus on “use” by migratory birds, rather than the nexus between the
isolated water and navigable waters, would prove to be the Migratory Bird Rule’s
downfall. Id. at 45.
71. Id. at 45.
72. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty., 531 U.S. at 167.
73. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 46.
74. 547 U.S. 715, 722 (2006).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 732.
77. Id. at 742.
78. Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Corps.79 As a result, the Corps was left in a precarious situation with no
clear guidance as to its jurisdictional authority. To cover all of the bases,
the Corps announced that its “significant nexus analysis would focus on
whether the waters in question ‘significantly affect the chemical,
physical and biological integrity of downstream traditional navigable
waters.’”80
Of course, the root cause of much of the debate surrounding wetland
definitions stems from the fact that what constitutes a wetland can vary
greatly depending upon the methodology used to define it.81 For
instance, Gardner points out that in 1987, for purposes of defining
wetland boundaries, the Corps delineation manual focused its analysis on
“hydrology, vegetation, and soils,” while the EPA placed a greater
reliance on vegetation.82 Even when a joint agency manual was released
in 1989, regulatory interpretation of that manual resulted in large-scale
reclassification of wetland areas, which in turn resulted in the
implementation of a public notice-and-comment rulemaking requirement
by the Bush Administration.83 With so much debate even within the
scientific community, it should come as little surprise that the Supreme
Court has found this issue to be a difficult one as well.
Gardner suggests that the solution to the definitional strife created by
the Clean Water Act is for Congress to resolve the ambiguity itself.84
Another solution, espoused by Chief Justice Roberts in his Rapanos
concurrence, would be for the Corps to utilize its rulemaking authority to
establish an outer boundary to the “reach of [its] authority. . . . [rather
than] adher[ing] to its essentially boundless view of the scope of its
power.”85 Both solutions, it seems, would resolve the problem.
Gardner’s suggestion would be the purist’s solution. But, the likelihood
of such a clarification coming from Congress is minimal because the
ambiguities that exist within the Clean Water Act are political
kryptonite.86 As a result, the most timely solution may well be for the
Corps and EPA to make some effort to limit their own authority through
a comprehensive rulemaking process. What such an action would do
toward protecting the environment is another question entirely. While
79. Id. at 767.
80. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 53.
81. Id. at 36.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 54.
85. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
86. Gardner recognizes the political difficulties presented by the Congressional
amendment process. GARDNER, supra note 1, at 56.
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this solution would not prove painless, it presents a more likely
resolution to the definitional question.
B. Dredge and Fill
While operating within the “waters of the United States” will bring
one within the geographical jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act, it will
not necessarily make one subject to regulation under the Act.87 Among
the activities prohibited by the Clean Water Act is the “point source
discharge” of “dredged or fill material.”88 Thus, removing vegetation,
excavating, dredging, and draining wetlands is not itself illegal.89 The
illegality arises with the discharge of materials.90 Here, too, definitions
have proven problematic.91 The Act defines “point source” as “any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,”92 and discharge has been
defined as “an addition of a pollutant from a point source.”93 Thus, when
a North Carolina developer wanted to drain 700 acres of wetland to
construct a housing development he simply dug ditches around the
property and hauled the dredged material offsite to avoid the section 404
process.94 The Corps observed these activities but determined that it
lacked jurisdiction because the developer was not discharging the
material on the wetland itself.95 Once the wetland was drained, the
developer had it reclassified and built his development.96 After this
incident, the Corps established a final rule that interpreted the addition of
dredge and fill material to include “incidental fallback” materials (those
materials that fell to the ground during removal), but this rule was soon
overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in National
Mining Association v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as an invalid
interpretation of the Clean Water Act.97
The Supreme Court had a chance to weigh in on the definitional
question in Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 58.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id.
Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006).
Id. § 1362(12).
GARDNER, supra note 1, at 61.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 62 (citing 145 F.3d 1399, 1410 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
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Engineers.98 In this case, the question was whether relocating topsoil
through the process of “deep ripping” constituted an addition of dredge
or fill material within the meaning of the Act.99 The decision was a 4-4
split, as Justice Kennedy had to recuse himself because he was a friend
of the landowner.100 Thus, Gardner says, whether “deep plowing results
in an addition of pollutant remains an open question.”101
The above are just some of the definitional questions explored by
Gardner in his book. There are, as one can imagine, numerous other
examples worth exploring, and Gardner does each great service by
providing a clear explanation of the factors that have driven the debates.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In his conclusion, Gardner makes several recommendations for
improving the system:
• Congress should pass the Clean Water Restoration Act to
remove doubts about federal jurisdiction over wetlands by
deleting the reference to “navigable waters” in the Clean Water
Act.
• The Corps should reorient its regulatory philosophy.
• The Corps needs to emphasize avoidance of wetland impacts and
deny more permits.
• The EPA should maintain its veto authority of wetland impacts
and not hesitate to unsheathe it.
• The Corps should eliminate NWP 21.
• The Corps should make permit decisions on a watershed basis,
taking into account cumulative impacts.
• The Corps and EPA should identify minimization best practices.
• The Corps should implement the regulatory preference for
compensation from mitigation banks; at the same time, the Corps
should tighten up on early credit releases.
• Compensatory mitigation sites must be monitored by the
agencies.
• The Corps and other agencies should focus on the long-term
stewardship of compensatory mitigation sites.

98.
99.
100.
101.

261 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 537 U.S. 99 (2002).
Id. at 812.
GARDNER, supra note 1, at 65.
Id. at 65.
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The Corps should encourage and accept preservation of high
quality wetlands as compensatory mitigation, including
“preservation only” packages.
• The federal government should create and maintain incentives
for wetland restoration, including the possibility of ecosystem
credit stacking.
• Congress should discontinue perverse incentives that contribute
to wetland destruction.
• The Corps and EPA should increase enforcement efforts and use
technology to do so.
• The Corps should provide more transparency in the section 404
program.102
Gardner’s recommendations are sound. He envisions a process that
involves participants at every level while recognizing the importance that
agency discretion plays in the outcome.103 While these recommendations
would require considerable financial commitments by Congress, their
implementation would almost certainly create a better process as a
whole. That being said, one must assume that in this imperfect world, no
such perfect system will ever exist. However, great strides could be
made if only a few of these recommendations were implemented, and the
fates of several of them are chained together. For example, if Congress
were to clarify federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act by
removing the term “navigable waters,” the Corps and EPA would be
more able to provide transparency to the section 404 program and
reorient their regulatory philosophy.
One serious hurdle to Gardner’s recommendations is the economic
strain that stems from a society that is already struggling against a
recession. Expansion of federal jurisdiction over wetlands would subject
more development projects to the section 404 permitting process. This in
turn slows down economic development in the interest of environmental
protection. Such would also be the case if the Corps were to cut back on
the number of permits it issues. The result is that these regulatory
changes would likely garner little in the way of political support at
present.
The obvious alternative to stronger regulation is to optimize the use
of the mitigation banking system, as Gardner suggests. While the overall
viability of mitigation banking is still in question, the process does at
least result in the preservation and restoration of wetlands. It also
promotes economic activity rather than restraining it. Gardner’s
102. Id. at 191-96.
103. Id. at 197.
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suggestion of credit stacking presents an intriguing option for promoting
both the economic and environmental interests that are at stake here.
Credit stacking generally refers to establishing two or more
different types of ecosystem credits on the same parcel of
property. For example, one spatially overlapping area might
produce wetland, endangered species, water quality, and/or
carbon sequestration credits. Credit stacking would permit the
owner of the credits to sell them in different markets and thus
have a diversified revenue stream. One environmental benefit of
stacking is that it may provide a financial incentive for some
property owners to conserve their land when they might
otherwise be reluctant to do so. The danger is that the property
owner might be essentially selling the same environmental
benefit multiple times.104
It is probably true that under a stacking program a lower aggregate
number of acreage would be protected because a single acre could
qualify for several programs. However, it is also probably true that more
property owners would be enticed to protect their property through a
stacking program because of the greater reward for doing so. Such a
program would come at a minimal cost to the government and would
expand the market for energy and environmental credits. As such,
Gardner’s stacking proposal presents an option that should be strongly
considered by policy makers.
In conclusion, Lawyers, Swamps, and Money is both comprehensive
and complete. Professor Gardner brings to bear his considerable
experience in wetland law to create a book that is both concise and
refreshing in its treatment of the issues at hand. Throughout the book,
Gardner’s humor adds a pleasant touch that keeps the reader turning the
pages. In the end, the reader is left with a strong impression that wetland
policy is in need of change; just how to implement that change in the
face of economic and environmental pressures is the intellectual
challenge. In short, this book is a must read for anyone interested in
learning about or hoping to change wetland policy in the United States.

104. Id. at 195.

